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Although the open outcry method is still the best way to trade highly active contracts on futures
exchanges, electronic systems can improve the efficiency and cost effectiveness of trading some
types of futures and options. In recent years, the volume of electronic trades on futures
exchanges has more than doubled, and it should continue to grow rapidly. 
increasing their use of electronic trading systems. Indeed,
from 1989 to 1996, volume on electronic trading systems
used by futures exchanges more than doubled, rising from
7 percent of the world’s trading volume to 18 percent
(Price Waterhouse 1997).
What are the principal features of these new electronic
trading systems? And how do these systems compare with
the open outcry method of trading traditionally used by
futures exchanges? This edition of Current Issues
explores the advantages and disadvantages of the two
types of trading methods and considers how futures
exchanges are likely to evolve in an electronic age.
Open Outcry Trading
The largest organized futures exchanges in the world—
most notably, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), and London’s
LIFFE—use the open outcry method of trading. 
To place an order under this method, the customer calls
a broker, who time-stamps the order and prepares an
office order ticket. The broker then sends the order to a
booth on the exchange floor. There, a floor order ticket is
prepared, and a clerk hand delivers the order to the floor
trader for execution. In some cases, the floor clerk may
use hand signals to convey the order to floor traders.
Large orders typically go directly from the customer to
the broker’s floor booth.
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Most futures exchanges are nonprofit organizations
whose members include banks, investment houses, and
independent traders. Futures exchanges provide exclu-
sive access to centralized marketplaces where members
buy and sell futures and options contracts for them-
selves and outside customers.1 In return for use of
exchange facilities, members pay fees for each transac-
tion. Members also pay indirect costs in the form of
lost revenues when trading volume and frequency of
trades are low, or a market is illiquid. Thus, the goal of
an exchange is to minimize members’ fees and ensure
liquidity by generating high trading volume for the
contracts listed on the exchange.
In the past, futures exchanges mostly relied on product
innovation to generate trading volume. By introducing
futures and options on popular assets such as U.S.
Treasury instruments, futures exchanges successfully
built trading volume. The introduction of futures and
options on newer assets, however, has proved more chal-
lenging. Many of these assets tend to be more specialized
and thus less likely to attract broad investor interest. The
increase in the number of futures exchanges around the
world and competition from over-the-counter markets
have also put pressure on the volume of trades made on
individual exchanges.
One way futures exchanges are attempting to boost
trading volume and compete more effectively is byThe floor trader, standing in a central location called a
trading pit, negotiates a price by shouting out the order to
other floor traders, who bid on the order using hand 
signals. Once filled, the order is recorded manually by
both parties to a trade. At the end of each day, the clear-
inghouse settles trades by ensuring that no discrepancy
exists in the matched-trade information.
U.S. futures exchanges, where the open outcry method
prevails, have dominated global futures and options 
trading. In recent years, however, the world market share
held by U.S. exchanges has fallen dramatically: in 1997,
U.S. exchanges accounted for 41 percent of the trading 
volume of exchange-traded products, compared with 
65 percent in 1990.2 During the same period, many new
futures and options exchanges emerged abroad and 
trading volume on non-U.S. exchanges grew significantly
(Chart 1). A feature shared by many of these new 
exchanges is the automated execution of trades.
Electronic Trading Systems 
An automated trade execution system has three compo-
nents: computer terminals, where customer orders are
keyed in and trade confirmations are received, a host
computer that processes trades, and a network that links
the terminals to the host computer. Customers may
enter orders directly into the terminal or phone in the
order to a broker. Although order execution can occur in
various ways, the electronic order-matching system is
the most popular on futures exchanges.3
With electronic order-matching systems, the host com-
puter matches bids with offers according to certain rules
that determine an order’s priority. Priority rules on most
systems include price and time of entry. In some cases,
priority rules may also include order size, type of order,
and the identity of the customer who placed the order. In
the simplest case, matching occurs when a trader places 
a buy order at a price equal to or higher than the price of
an existing sell order for the same contract. The host 
computer automatically executes the order, so that trades
are matched immediately. Trades are then cleared as 
they occur, as long as the host computer is linked to the
clearinghouse.
With advances in technology, electronic trading has
gained momentum. The number of exchanges worldwide
that use electronic systems in varying degrees to trade
futures and options increased from eight in 1990 to about
forty in 1997 (Baptiste, Kang, and Rosenfeld 1993;
authors’ calculations). Most of these exchanges are
located outside the United States. The German Bund
futures contract4 trades on both an automated exchange in
Germany (DTB) and an open outcry exchange in London
(LIFFE). DTB’s share of the Bund futures volume traded
on DTB and LIFFE has increased from 19 percent in
1991 to about 42 percent in 1997 (Chart 2).5 Since 1996,
at least five open outcry exchanges have either decided to
switch from open outcry to electronic trading or are con-
sidering such a move.6
Even exchanges using open outcry during regular 
trading hours rely largely on automated systems for after-
hours trading. The CBOT’s Project A, the CME’s Globex,
and LIFFE’s Automated Pit Trading (APT) are three
examples. In 1997, volume on the CME’s Globex and the
CBOT’s Project A increased 118 and 143 percent, respec-
tively, while total volume on these exchanges grew by
13.4 and 9.1 percent, respectively. Growth in volume on
LIFFE’s APT system has been steady, averaging about 
33 percent per year from 1990 to 1997.
In addition, some contracts on open outcry 
exchanges—including all options and small futures
orders on the CME’s E-Mini Standard and Poor’s 500 
contract—trade around the clock on electronic trading
systems. On E-Mini’s first day of trading in 1997, volume
reached nearly 8,000 contracts—the highest opening day
volume of any product currently listed on the CME.
Comparing Open Outcry and Electronic Trading
How effective is the electronic trading system relative
to the open outcry method for trading futures and
options? The two most important measures of a trading
system’s effectiveness are its ability to create liquidity
and its ability to reduce direct costs for market partici-
pants.7 Other considerations are availability of informa-
tion, operating efficiency, and potential for trading
abuses (see table). A comparison of the two systems
shows that although open outcry trading remains a more
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Chart 1effective method for trading highly active contracts,
electronic trading has the potential to enhance the effi-
ciency and cost effectiveness of trading some types of
futures and options.
Market Liquidity
Investors in futures markets need to buy or sell futures
contracts quickly and at a fair price. Their ability to do so
depends on the existence of traders willing to take the
other side of the trade and, in the process, supply liquidity.
In a floor trading system, liquidity is supplied by traders
who must be continually available for business even when
trading activity on the floor is limited. Traders who supply
liquidity in an electronic trading system, by contrast, can
easily shift their efforts to trade a different contract on the
computer screen when trading activity is slow in one con-
tract. Thus, new exchanges, where initial activity in the
contracts tends to be low, typically prefer electronic trad-
ing systems.
By contrast, the evidence suggests that highly active
contracts are better traded on open outcry exchanges than
on electronic exchanges. For example, firms that trade
large blocks of contracts on DTB complain that they have
to pay more than those trading a relatively small number
of contracts (Kharouf 1998). Floor traders are skilled at
executing large trades and other complex trades such as
“stop loss” orders and “spread” trades, with minimal
impact on prices.8 In particular, locals (floor traders who
buy and sell for their own accounts) trade frequently and
are important suppliers of liquidity.
Electronic trading systems are not likely to replace the
ability of floor traders to execute large and complex trades
anytime soon. Although DTB has been successful in
wresting market share from LIFFE in the Bund futures
contracts, LIFFE still dominates the market for the more
complex Bund options contracts. Because the success of
locals’ trading is largely dependent on observing other
traders on the floor, locals tend to avoid screen-based 
systems. Moreover, complex trades are difficult to enter
electronically and may require additional handling. To exe-
cute a stop loss order, for example, futures brokers may
instruct their clerks to monitor prices manually and then to
enter the orders in the electronic system as appropriate.
Nonetheless, improvements in electronic trading 
systems are increasing the systems’ ability to handle
large, complex trades. DTB has upgraded its electronic
trading system to allow spread trades and to handle more
trading activity. In addition, electronic trading systems
potentially permit trades that are not possible on open out-
cry, such as the simultaneous trading of both an asset and
a futures contract based on that asset. 
Perhaps the greatest advantage of electronic trading is
its ability to promote cross-border trading. The experience
of DTB, a pioneer in promoting trading by nonresident
investors through local access points or direct computer
connections, illustrates the potential of remote trading to
expand an exchange’s business. By November 1997, 65 of
DTB’s 171 members were remote traders. Electronic
exchanges can also form linkages with each other.
Domowitz (1995) calls such linkages “implicit mergers”
because they increase the capacity of exchanges to handle
larger trading volumes at lower cost while providing
investors with a wider array of products to trade.
Cost Issues
On both electronic and open outcry exchanges, member
firms bear the fixed costs of operations, which are paid
regardless of the volume traded. Fixed costs, deter-
mined by the number of traders employed and their
salaries, are higher for open outcry markets. Generally,
screen-based trading requires less labor, skill, and time.
According to DTB calculations, the labor costs of trad-
ing the Bund contract on LIFFE are two to three times
higher than on DTB (Price Waterhouse 1997). The vari-
able costs of processing customer orders are also lower
for electronic trading. However, the initial capital cost
to a trader of purchasing a computer workstation is
larger than the cost of setting up a floor booth.
Differences in overhead costs are also significant.
Exchange overhead costs, which include building,
staffing, and back-office costs, tend to be higher for open
outcry markets. The CBOT and the New York Mercantile
Exchange, for example, recently built new trading pits for
$180 million and $228 million, respectively. Electronic
exchanges, in contrast, often buy entire trading systems
from other exchanges or private companies. With the
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Chart 2reduction in prices of computer hardware, the cost of buy-
ing these systems has fallen dramatically (Domowitz
1995). During 1997, the Swedish electronic exchange
OM earned nearly $40 million by selling its popular
CLICK trading system to several new and existing
exchanges.
Higher overhead costs lead to higher fees for members
and, ultimately, higher transactions costs for all market
participants. Although fees are relatively high in all
exchange markets, participants in open outcry markets
claim that their fees are particularly high (Lucchetti
1997). LIFFE, for example, charges about $1.50 per
round turn (that is, for buying and selling a contract) for
the Bund futures contract; DTB charges only $0.66 per
round turn for the same contract. On open outcry
exchanges in the United States, exchange fees are about
$1.50 per round turn (Cavaletti 1997a).
Open outcry exchanges have taken limited steps to
reduce costs. In particular, London exchanges have
reduced costs by merging their clearing operations.
Exchanges in the United States have also recognized the
need to cut costs and increase operational efficiency
through automation (Massimb and Phelps 1994).
Currently, a significant percentage of the CME’s and
CBOT’s annual expenses go to data processing, systems
development, and communications—about 25 percent in
1993 alone, for a total of about $55 million (Risk
Management Center of Chicago 1996). Progress in
reducing costs, however, has been slow. Although the
Chicago exchanges have spent at least $20 million to
develop hand-held terminals that floor traders can use 
to record orders and report trades (Miller 1997), the 
terminals are still in limited use, and the technology is
not yet completely reliable. Only about 10 percent of the
members of the CME and the CBOT use electronic order
routing (Cavaletti 1997b). In addition, except for the
CME’s E-Mini futures contract, the Chicago exchanges
have not automated trade execution for small orders 
during regular trading hours, a step that would 
likely attract more retail customers. Efforts to merge
clearing operations of the Chicago exchanges have not
yet succeeded.9
Other Points of Comparison
Both open outcry markets and automated trading sys-
tems provide a wealth of information to participants.
One of the principal benefits of open outcry, however, is
that traders can observe the behavior of other traders on
the floor. For example, by noting whether other traders
have large buy or sell positions, a trader can infer the
future trading behavior of competitors. In addition,
because traders’ quotes are only valid for an instant,
traders can easily revise their quotes in response to
unfavorable price movements.
By contrast, traders using electronic trading systems
cannot identify counterparties. Further, because traders
must actively withdraw quotes from the screen, quote
revision takes more time than in open outcry trading.
These disadvantages are offset by the fact that electronic
traders have real-time access to market analytics and
breaking news, information that is not easily accessible
from the trading floor. In addition, many electronic trad-
ing systems display the “order book” (a list of the current
best bids and offers), so that traders can calculate quanti-
ties offered and demanded at current prices.
Also notable is the ability of electronic trading to virtu-
ally eliminate errors in recording orders and reporting
trades, resulting in significant cost savings. Customer
orders in open outcry markets go through several interme-
diaries before reaching the trading floor, increasing 
processing time and the chance of errors in recording
orders. “Out trades,” or error trades, occur when floor
traders mistakenly report the same trade differently. With
electronic trading systems, out trades cannot occur, and
mistakes in recording orders only slip through when
orders are typed into the computer incorrectly. 
Neither open outcry nor electronic exchanges can
completely eliminate illegal trading activity. On the 
trading floor, traders may behave opportunistically by col-
luding with other traders to prearrange customer trades,
by taking the opposite side of a customer order without
exposing it to the market (noncompetitive trading), or by
trading ahead of the order (front running). In electronic
trading, brokers may withhold customer orders prior to
execution. In addition, the ability to move easily among
contracts on the screen may lead to the manipulation of
customer orders.10
Electronic trading systems on the whole, however, are
easier to regulate than open outcry trading. Clearing firms
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Comparing Open Outcry and Electronic Trading
Open Outcry Trading  Electronic Trading
Main suppliers     Locals Large institutions;
of liquidity market-making firms
Primary costs Upkeep and staffing   Upgrading of software 
of trading floor;   and hardware; telecom-
back-office tasks munications costs
Information  Traders’observations   Order book; outside
sources of market activity news sources
Operating  Large time and labor  Speed, accuracy, and
efficiency investment; potential  transparency 
for errors
Possible sources   Lack of precise trade   Manipulation of orders
of trading abuse records; lack of  prior to entry
anonymity in trading can monitor the risk position of traders as trades occur.
Because trades are recorded accurately and in detail, reg-
ulators can monitor all transactions and spot suspicious
patterns in the data.
Interestingly, existing research regarding the relative
merits of open outcry and electronic trading does not
clearly favor either method. Empirical studies comparing
the cost of trading in electronic and open outcry markets
have mostly focused on the German Bund futures con-
tract. Unfortunately, results from these studies often 
contradict each other and are undermined by data limita-
tions.11 Still, the potential for electronic trading to
improve efficiency and to reduce costs for both exchanges
and traders seems difficult to ignore. 
What’s Ahead 
In Khan and Ireland’s (1993) survey of futures and
options market participants, traders opposed to elec-
tronic trading spoke of the “smell” and “buzz” of open
outcry trading, and the importance of these intangible
factors in trading decisions. A new generation of
traders, at ease with computers, may feel more friendly
toward electronic trading. Price Waterhouse (1997)
reports increased support for electronic trading systems
among brokers and fund managers. The new generation
of computer-friendly traders, who may include large
institutional traders and market-making firms, will
likely supplant locals as liquidity suppliers to electronic
trading systems. For example, the recent surge in 
volume of DTB’s Bund futures contracts has come
mostly from new members.
The prospects for electronic trading may be further
advanced by the European Monetary Union scheduled 
to begin in 1999. To promote cross-border trading, 
electronic exchanges can provide remote access for non-
resident investors and form cooperative links with inde-
pendent exchanges. The first electronic link between
independent exchanges took place in early 1997.
Exchanges in London, Oslo, and Stockholm allowed 130
members from seven countries to trade futures and
options in real time. More recently, futures exchanges in
France, Germany, and Switzerland adopted a common
electronic trading and clearing platform. 
Open outcry exchanges also extend their markets by
establishing links with exchanges in different time
zones, but in a more limited way than electronic
exchanges. Both the number of participants and the
range of contracts in open outcry markets are con-
strained by the size of the trading floor. For example, in
1997, an open outcry trading link between LIFFE and
the CBOT suffered from low trading volume and was
eventually canceled. Instead, LIFFE has chosen to con-
centrate on electronic trading systems for its after-hours
links with other exchanges. The CBOT is in the process
of installing several Project A electronic trading termi-
nals in Europe and the Far East.
Despite the potential benefits of automating trading
operations, open outcry exchanges have often faced oppo-
sition to such efforts from some trader members. For early
adopters of electronic trading systems, the costs (such as
learning new skills and incompatibility with floor trading)
may appear to outweigh the benefits. Because of this 
hurdle, the benefits realized by automating trading 
operations must be substantial before exchange members
will support electronic trading (Domowitz 1995). To 
overcome resistance, some open outcry exchanges are
sharing the benefits of automation with members. The
CBOT, for example, shares 70 percent of profits from
Project A with full exchange members and 20 percent
with clearing members.
Conclusion
Electronic trading systems have become increasingly
popular in the past decade and currently account for
about one-fifth of volume on futures exchanges.
Driving this rise in popularity is the potential for elec-
tronic trading to improve efficiency and lower costs. In
addition, electronic trading systems make exchanges
available to remote investors in real time, an important
benefit in a period of increased cross-border trading.
On open outcry exchanges, skilled floor traders 
continue to provide high levels of liquidity for outside 
customers. However, even these exchanges have adopted
electronic trading systems for selected products and for
after-hours trading. As technology advances, the trading
process on futures exchanges is likely to become increas-
ingly automated and the volume of electronically traded
futures and options contracts should grow rapidly.
Notes
1. A futures contract is an agreement between two parties to buy
or sell an asset at a set price on a particular date. An options contract
gives the option purchaser the right, but not the obligation, to buy or
sell an asset at a specified price on or before a specified date.
2. Figures for exchange-traded products include futures, options
on futures, and options on stock indexes, interest rates, and curren-
cies. U.S. futures exchanges trade only futures and options on
futures. Other types of options, such as options on stock indexes or
individual stocks, are traded on U.S. securities exchanges, which are
not the subject of our study. 
3. Sundel and Blake (1991) and Domowitz (1992) compare alter-
native electronic systems.
4. The German Bund futures contract is based on long-term
notional debt securities issued by the German federal government,
or the Treuhandanstalt, with a term of 8.5 to 10.5 years and an inter-
est rate of 6 percent. 
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5. Exchange data were supplied by the various exchanges and the
Futures Industry Association. 
6. For example, the Sydney Futures Exchange of Australia, one of
the twenty largest futures exchanges in the world, recently decided
to adopt electronic trading. 
7. See Khan and Ireland (1993) for a comparison of the two sys-
tems that is based on a survey of market participants and exchange
managers in Europe. 
8. With stop loss orders, traders buy or sell the contract when it
reaches a specified price. Spread trades involve the simultaneous
purchase and sale of two different futures contracts.
9. A promising development is Clearing 21, a joint venture of the
CME and the New York Mercantile Exchange that allows real-time
trade processing.
10. See Sundel and Blake (1991) for a discussion of trading
abuses on electronic trading systems.
11. Of studies comparing trading costs between DTB and LIFFE,
Pirrong (1996) concludes that volatility was lower and liquidity
higher on DTB, but Shyy and Lee (1995) come to the opposite con-
clusion. Kofman and Moser (1997) find no difference in liquidity
but suggest that there may be more information-based trading on
DTB. Breedon and Holland (1997) argue that the results obtained are
highly sensitive to whether quote data or transactions data are used.
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